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CONSEQUENCES OF MODELING
HABIT PERSISTENCE
LUCA BOSSI AND PERE GOMIS-PORQUERAS
University of Miami
In this paper, we study the stationary and non-stationary equilibria of a deterministic, pure
exchange, two-period overlapping generations model with habit persistence. We show that
preferences with multiplicative habits can lead to quite different equilibrium outcomes
compared to subtractive ones. The two most commonly adopted habit specifications can
differ in terms of homotheticity, gross substitutability, and uniqueness of equilibria. We
illustrate these differences in terms of steady-state equilibria, as well as local
dynamics.
Keywords: Multiplicative and Subtractive Habit Persistence, Multiple Equilibria,
Equilibrium Dynamics
1. INTRODUCTION
A recent strand of the economic literature has analyzed theoretical and empirical
implications of endogenous preferences, those that depend on time, personal ex-
perience, or social conditions. Among the different forms of endogenous prefe-
rences the ones displaying habits have received particular attention. The literature
on habit persistence specifies preferences either using subtractive (SH) or multi-
plicative habits (MH), according to the terminology introduced by Carroll (2000).1
Although habits have helped shed some light on several economic phenomena,
not much attention has been paid to the economic consequences of these two
alternative formulations. For example, Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990)
reach similar conclusions using the two alternative formulations in the context of
risk premium. This may seem to suggest, prima facie, that the qualitative properties
of models with SH and MH are pretty similar. However, Wendner (2003), shows
that the two most commonly used habit specifications may easily lead to opposite
implications regarding household savings behavior. He shows that in response to
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an increase in the strength of habits, young households may increase savings in
the case of SH, whereas they may lower savings in the case of MH. Furthermore,
Carroll (2000) points out that under plausible parameter values, SH may give rise
to a not well-defined utility in stochastic environments, whereas this is not the
case using MH.
Recently, Chen and Ludvigson (2006) point out the lack of theoretical studies
on the functional form of habit persistence. Using semi-parametric and structural
econometric approaches, they “reverse engineer” the habit specification that best
matches the cross-sections of asset returns on a relatively large portfolio. Their
empirical findings suggest that the habit function should be nonlinear in current
and past consumption rather than linear. Hence, they seem to suggest that a MH
specification is empirically preferred to a SH one. A theoretical investigation of
the underlying properties of the two habit formulations is thus needed.
The objective of this paper is to study the two alternative formulations adopted
in the literature and to examine their differences in terms of multiplicity of steady
states, dynamic indeterminacy, and local dynamics within an overlapping genera-
tion framework. Understanding how optimal savings decisions change according
to different preference specifications is crucial because intertemporal consumption
decisions are at the core of macroeconomic analysis. We explore the consequences
of specifying different forms of habit persistence in a pure exchange, two-period
lived overlapping generations model. Habit persistence in this setting has been
previously explored. Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) consider SH in a pure exchange
overlapping generations framework and show that increasing the strength of habits
raises desired savings and might lead to endogenous cycles. In a similar framework,
Bunzel (2006) argues that both SH and MH yield dynamic behaviors that are qua-
litatively very similar. In this study, we show that this finding does not always
hold.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that modeling preferences with
MH or SH yields theoretical predictions that are not necessarily equivalent. We
find that modeling habit persistence with MH may not always yield concave or
homothetic preferences over consumption. This modeling choice can give rise
to multiple monetary steady states, and hence stationary sunspots equilibria may
arise. In addition, the stability properties of an economy with MH change dras-
tically as we vary the strength of habits. Adopting the hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) class of preferences, we find instances in which there is a unique
steady state under both specifications. However, we also find cases in which there
are multiple steady states under MH, whereas there is a unique steady state under
SH. Thus, the resulting qualitative properties of the economy under SH and that
under MH can be quite different. If the choice of how to model savings behavior
in the presence of habits is not innocuous, the predictions and policy prescrip-
tions based on the two types of habit persistence could be quite different as
well.
In the next section, we introduce the general model with MH and SH and study
the corresponding concavity and homotheticity properties of these preferences.
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Then, we analyze the steady state equilibria and their associated dynamics. In
Section 3, we provide a general result on the difference in the dynamics under the
Classical case. In Section 4, we present numerical examples that suggest, once
again, nonnegligible discrepancies across MH and SH in terms of local stability
properties of the steady states. The last section summarizes our main findings and
concludes. The proofs can be found in the appendix.
2. THE MODEL
This paper builds on Gale (1973) and Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) by considering
a pure exchange overlapping generations model. Complex dynamics and endoge-
nous cycles have been shown to emerge in overlapping generation models with
production or a variety of different assumptions concerning market imperfections.2
Here we abstract from technology to reinforce the point we are trying to make:
with habits, differences in dynamics and in steady-states properties need not to be
driven by the production side of the economy but, rather, by the modeling choice of
preferences alone. Economic activity takes place over infinite discrete time. Each
generation lives for two periods and has perfect foresight. Agents are endowed
with w1 units of the single good when young, and with w2 units when old.
Utility is derived from consumption in both periods. However, because of the
presence of habit formation, utility of a given level of consumption when old
depends on consumption when young.3 Formally:
V (c1, c2) = u(c1) + βu(c1, c2; γ ), (1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the strength of habits in the instantaneous utility function
and β is the discount factor. We assume that the function u(.) is well behaved,
that is, strictly increasing, strictly concave, homogeneous, and twice continu-
ously differentiable. If one considers SH, then preferences are typically given
by u(c1, c2; γ ) = v(c2 − γ c1) as in Lahiri and Puhakka (1998).4 If, instead,
the instantaneous utility is specified with MH, we have u(c1, c2; γ ) = v(c2/cγ1 ).
Regardless of the specification considered, the importance of past consumption in
determining the utility derived by the “effective” consumption is increasing with
γ .5 Each agent maximizes utility subject to budget constraints; c1 = w1 − st when
young, and c2 = w2 + Rtst when old. st and Rt denote savings when young and
the gross nominal interest rate on savings at time t , respectively. As pointed out
by Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), we need to impose conditions on the parameters
to ensure that the indifference curves are downward sloping. These conditions for
the subtractive and multiplicative case are, respectively,
u′(c1)
v′(c2 − γ c1) − γβ > 0 (2)
u′(c1)
c2c
−(1+γ )
1 v
′(c2c−γ1 ) − γβ > 0. (3)
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In what follows, we first study the concavity, homothetic properties, and the
steady-state equilibria that emerge in each case. We then explore the local dynamic
properties of the equilibria under each habit specification.
2.1. Preferences
One of the most important differences across alternative habit specifications is
in terms of their implications for the underlying preferences. Alonso-Carrera,
Caballe´, and Raurich (2005) show that when habits are introduced multiplicatively
in a capital accumulation model, the consumers’ objective function might fail to
be concave. In this paper, we find a similar result for pure exchange overlapping
generation models as stated in Proposition 1.
LEMMA 1 (Concavity). Consider a pure exchange two-period lived overlap-
ping generations model. Then we have that: (i) under SH persistence, the utility
function is strictly concave in consumption, and (ii) under MH persistence, con-
cavity is not always ensured.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 1 implies that one needs to be cautious when solving for the consumption
plan that maximizes consumers’ utility under MH. This result, as well as the next
one, applies to all sort of models; not only those set up in an overlapping generation
framework. The next proposition outlines another crucial implication in terms of
the savings function resulting from the consumer’s problem. The adoption of MH
or SH can greatly affect the savings behavior, even if other fundamentals remain
the same.
PROPOSITION 1 (Homotheticity). If the instantaneous utility function u(.) is
homogeneous of degree n, then the SH specification yields homothetic preferences
whereas the MH specification does not.
Proof. See appendix.
The result on homotheticity of preferences is important for overlapping gene-
rations economies. Homotheticity of the utility function implies existence of a
nontrivial steady state in this model of pure exchange, as it will be pointed out later
in the proof of Proposition 2.6 Furthermore, it is well known that, in overlapping
generations models, the saving function is linear in income/endowments if the
lifetime utility function is homothetic [de la Croix and Michel (2002)]. Thus, in
general, we expect to observe substantial differences in the underlying dynamics
between SH and MH specifications. This particular comparison is carried out in
Sections 3 and 4.
Nonhomotheticity has also important implications for economies in different
frameworks. When preferences are homothetic the indirect utility function can be
written as a linear function of wealth. Hence, wealth elasticities of demand are
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constant and the Engel curves are linear. When preferences are nonhomothetic,
instead, the Engel curves are typically non linear in wealth. This difference is
of crucial importance for researchers interested in public finance and applied
microeconomics in general. The behavior of the Engel curves is critical in under-
standing the impact of tax reforms. For example, Bossi, Gomis-Porqueras, and
Kelly (2007) are the first to characterize the conditions under which taxation of
addictive goods might differ from taxes on leisure and other consumption goods
in a dynamic Ramsey setting with habit persistence. Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel
(1997) also point out that by failing to model the Engel curve correctly, one can
badly misspecify the distribution of welfare losses at the empirical level. Thus, the
modeling choice for habits is not harmless.
2.2. Steady State Equilibria
In this section, we show that if one adopts SH, then there exists a unique monetary
steady state while under MH multiple monetary equilibria cannot be ruled out.
The optimal savings function for a young agent in this model with MH is defined
as follows:
s∗ = arg max u(w1 − s) + βv
(
Rs + w2
(w1 − s)γ
)
. (4)
Thus, the equation that defines the optimal savings can be written as
F(s) = −u′ (w1 − s) + βv′
(
Rs + w2
(w1 − s)γ
)[
R(w1 − s) + γ (Rs + w2)
(w1 − s)γ+1
]
= 0.
(5)
The implicit function for optimal savings under SH, by contrast, is given by the
following equation:
G(s) = −u′(w1 − s) + (R + γ )βv′((R + γ )s + w2 − γw1) = 0. (6)
To close the model and to analyze the steady states, we introduce an outside
asset into the economy. Following Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), we assume that
there is a government that borrows from and lends to the public. This approach is
clearly equivalent to injecting valueless fiat money into the economy. Government
liabilities in period t are denoted by bt , and the real deficit by dt . The government’s
budget constraint for period t is then given by
dt + Rt−1bt−1 = bt . (7)
Asset market equilibrium requires that bt = st for all t . Setting the government’s
deficit to zero, the law of motion for this economy is defined as follows:
st+1 = stRt , (8)
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which also represents the offer curve for this economy. If bt > 0, then the economy
is in the Samuelson case (i.e., agents have positive savings) according to the
terminology first coined by Gale (1973). Instead, if bt < 0, then the economy is
in the Classical case (i.e., agents are borrowing).
Using a general instantaneous utility function does not always yield an explicit
expression for optimal savings nor for the gross interest elasticity of savings. Thus,
it is not possible to explicitly analyze equation (8). However, we can characterize a
crucial difference between SH and MH in a general setting where no explicit func-
tional form assumptions regarding the utility are made. The following proposition
states that the standard results on uniqueness of steady states do not necessarily
apply to the case with MH. This result will then have crucial implications for the
local dynamics of the economy.
PROPOSITION 2 (Uniqueness). Restrict the parameter space such that the
consumer’s problem is concave. Under SH, there always exists a unique monetary
steady state. Under MH, on the other hand, multiplicity of monetary steady states
cannot be ruled out.
Proof. See appendix.
The economic intuition behind this result is related to the possible lack of
gross substitutability under the MH specification. It is well known that when
consumption in the first and the second periods are weak gross substitutes, then
the steady state is unique.7 This condition can be verified by studying the sign of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Under the subtractive specification,
IES is always positive, whereas under the multiplicative case it can be negative.
Formally, the IES between consumption when young and old can be written as
(c1, c2) =
1
c1
∂V
∂c1
+ 1
c2
∂V
∂c2
−
∂2V
(∂c1)2(
∂V
∂c1
)2 + 2
∂2V
∂c1∂c2
∂V
∂c1
∂V
∂c2
−
∂2V
(∂c2)2(
∂V
∂c2
)2
. (9)
The crucial term in  is ∂2V
∂c1∂c2
; if this is negative then gross substitutability could
break down. One can verify that under SH
∂2V
∂c1∂c2
= −γβv′′(c2 − γ c1) > 0.
When we consider MH, instead, we obtain the following:
∂2V
∂c1∂c2
= −γβc−γ−11
[
v′
(
c2c
−γ
1
) + c2c−γ1 v′′(c2c−γ1 )].
The sign of this expression depends on the underlying parameter values of the
model.
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Under intertemporally nonseparable preferences, the elasticity of substitution
between current and future consumption is time variant. In particular, different
functional forms for the period utility imply different degrees of IES. A subtractive
specification implies that consumption in the first and the second periods are
always gross substitutes, whereas this is not necessarily true when a multiplicative
formulation is adopted. Because of the lack of gross substitutability, it is not
possible to rule out the existence of multiple monetary steady states under MH. In
the next section, we derive a general result on the dynamics in the Classical case.
After that, we present numerical examples that back up our theoretical findings
ans that highlight some of the differences between MH and SH modeling choices.
3. DYNAMICS
One clear message so far is that we should expect differences in the local dynamics
between the two specifications because of homotheticity or the lack thereof. Before
we proceed any further, let us establish a general result for the Classical case, which
follows directly from a theorem by Gale (1973). The following lemma, which
is taken from Gale (1973), together with Proposition 1 suggest that alternative
habit formulations can yield drastically different results in terms of dynamic
indeterminacy in the Classical case.
LEMMA 2 (Gale, 1973). In the Classical case, if the utility function is either
(i) separable, or (ii) homothetic then there exist a unique path approaching the
steady state given an initial condition.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 5 by Gale (1973, p. 25).
Weak gross substitutability implies that, if it exists, there is at most one equi-
librium price sequence which converges to the steady state. Lemma 2 and the
following proposition suggest that this is not necessarily the case for MH.
PROPOSITION 3. In the Classical case, SH lead to determinate dynamic equi-
librium whereas MH may display dynamic indeterminacy.
Proof. Recall that both habit specifications imply nonseparable preferences.
In addition, Proposition 1 proved that preferences are nonhomothetic under MH
while they are homothetic under SH. These facts together with Lemma 2 complete
the proof.
In general, the local dynamic properties are determined by the slope of the offer
curve given by
dst+1
dst
= Rt
(
1 + 1

)
(10)
where  is the gross interest rate elasticity of savings. Because we can not obtain a
closed form solution for the offer curve under MH nor under SH, it is not possible
to study its behavior analytically. For this reason, in the next section we provide
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numerical examples that illustrate how the dynamics can differ. In particular, we
show that multiple monetary steady states are possible under MH.
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In previous sections, we have highlighted the possibility of crucial differences in
terms of number of monetary steady states, local dynamics, and volatility between
SH and MH specifications. These differences are indeed important since they
have drastic consequences for the underlying observables of the economy. In this
section, we provide numerical examples that illustrate these differences both quali-
tatively and quantitatively. For our numerical examples, let us consider the class
of preferences with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA). This is a general
class that nests, as special cases, the family of utility functions with a constant
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), the one with a constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA), and the quadratic utility. The HARA family is commonly used
in the finance literature, which deals with asset pricing and savings’ behavior.8
Carroll and Kimball (1996) show how CARA and CRRA specifications imply a
savings behavior that is qualitatively very different from the one corresponding
to a HARA formulation. In particular, they show that under HARA preferences
and uncertainty, the consumption function is concave, whereas it is linear when
CARA and CRRA specifications are adopted.9 Therefore, the underlying choice
of preferences is crucial.
The HARA utility function takes the following form:
u(c) = 1
1 − σ
[
σ
(
A + αc
σ
)1−σ]
, (11)
where A and σ are real numbers, and α > 0. Incorporating MH in the HARA
family yields the following utility function for our example:
V (c1, c2) = 11 − σ
[
σ
(
A + αc1
σ
)1−σ]
+ β 1
1 − σ
[
σ
(
A + α
σ
c2
c
γ
1
)1−σ]
. (12)
Typically, to characterize the dynamic properties of this economy, we need to
determine the slope of the offer curve at each of the steady states. The marginal rate
of substitution at the initial endowment point should be studied as well. However,
the HARA utility function may not always be defined at the origin. Formally, the
utility function is defined if A + αc
σ
≥ 0. By substituting the budget constraint for
each period into the respective flow utilities we obtain an upper and a lower bound
on savings:
A + α(w1 − st )
σ
≥ 0, (B1)
and
A + α
σ
(w2 + Rtst )
(w1 − st )γ ≥ 0. (B2)
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TABLE 1. Benchmark example
SH MH
ss.s. −0.078 −0.747
cs.s.1 1.0778 1.747
cs.s2 1.024 0.356
 −7.296 −1.347
(1 + 1

) 0.863 0.258
PM −0.271 −0.069
detH 0.072 0.134
MRSC 0.55 0.817
(cs.s.1 , c
s.s
2 ) 1 1
Therefore, we need to make sure that these additional restrictions are met when
studying the examples.
In the benchmark case, we provide a simple economy that is in line with some
empirical regularities. Throughout our numerical analysis, we set β = 0.55, which
corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.97 when the generation considered
lasts 20 years. We also use data from Gourinchas and Parker (2002) for the life-
cycle profiles of income. The endowment parameters of our economy are set to
mimic their income data. On the basis of their data, we computed the ratio of
average income between the ages of 45 and 65 to the average income between the
ages of 26 and 44. This procedure yields 1.102 as the ratio of average income when
old to young. We assign the following parameter values to the utility function:
A = −1, α = 1, and σ = 0.226. Because there is a lack of evidence in terms
of the empirically plausible range of parameter values measuring the strength of
habits, we decided to adopt the following calibration strategy for our benchmark
example. We force the IES to be one, a value confirmed by most recent studies,10
across specifications and we retrieve the resulting γ . Given our previous results,
in particular the one concerning homotheticity, it is not surprising to find that the
strength of habits that matches an IES of 1 is different across specifications. The
resulting calibrated values are γ = 0.45 for the SH and γ = 0.415 for the MH
specification, respectively. In Table 1, we report our benchmark example.
The tables throughout our paper provide information regarding steady state
allocations for savings (ss.s.), consumption when young (cs.s.1 ) and when old (cs.s2 ),
the gross interest rate elasticity of savings (), and the slope of the offer curve
evaluated at the steady state (1 + 1

). The tables also report the principal minor
(PM) and the determinant of the associated Hessian at steady state (detH) as well.
We do so in light of Lemma 1 that points out the potential lack of concavity
under the MH case. Finally, we report the conditions established in equations (2)
and (3); that is, we have downward sloping indifference curves and meaningful
economic equilibria. These conditions are satisfied whenever MRSC is positive.
In addition, we provide the steady state intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
each example ((cs.s.1 , cs.s2 )).11
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Clearly, both economies are in the Classical case where steady states savings
are negative. In the benchmark case, the local dynamics of the monetary steady
states are similar: they are both stable since 0 < (1 + 1

) < 1. However, we find
that by varying slightly the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, (cs.s.1 , cs.s2 ),
the dynamic properties of the steady state can greatly differ as illustrated by the
following examples. As we decrease the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the
number of steady-state monetary equilibria and the corresponding local dynamics
vary depending on the specific habit formulation adopted.
Example 1. Holding all other parameters constant, if we set the IES = 0.929 for
both specifications we find that the implied strength of habits are γ = 0.8297 for
SH and γ = 0.45825 for MH. Furthermore, for these parameter values, we find
two monetary steady states under MH and a unique monetary steady state under
SH. The local dynamics associated with these two different sets of steady states
are quite different.
It is interesting to note that, as we decrease the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution by only 7.1% relative to our benchmark example, two steady states
with opposite stability properties emerge under MH, whereas the steady state
for SH remains unique but becomes unstable. Moreover, optimal savings across
the two specifications are starkly different. Under SH agents are saving, whereas
under MH agents are borrowing in the first monetary steady state and saving in
the second one. Thus, the implications for the resulting consumption throughout
the life cycle depend crucially on the underlying specification of habits.
An important difference between the two specifications, shown in this paper, is
the possibility of multiple monetary steady states. Whenever multiple equilibria
exist, sunspot equilibria can be constructed as a lottery between two deterministic
steady states as suggested by Cass and Shell (1983). Sunspot economies deliver
more volatility, thus we would expect to observe smoother consumption paths
under SH than under MH. Furthermore, because multiple steady states exist under
MH, bifurcation phenomena are possible as we vary the strength of habits.
The implications for the evolution of the economy in this case are different,
SH predict monotone divergence from the steady state given that the eigenvalue
[(1 + 1

)] is outside the unit circle. Similarly, under MH Steady State II is unstable
with diverging monotone dynamics as well. Steady state I, by contrast, exhibits
monotone convergence to the steady state since it has the eigenvalue inside the
unit circle. We can conclude then that the underlying dynamic properties crucially
depend on the modeling choice of habits.
Another interesting observation is that MH exhibits a Classical steady state
and a Samuelsonian steady state, suggesting that there are discontinuities in
the offer curve probably due to the aforementioned lack of concavity. De-
pending on their initial conditions, agents may end up perpetually borrowing
(Steady State I) or continuously changing their saving patterns (Steady State
II). The transitional dynamics also predicts that as long as the discontinuity
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TABLE 2. Multiplicity of equilibria under MH but not under SH
SH MH
Steady State Steady State I Steady State II
ss.s. 0.26 −0.744 0.771
cs.s.1 0.738 1.744 0.229
cs.s2 1.36 0.358 1.873
 1.348 −1.330 0.007
(1 + 1

) 1.742 0.248 142.677
PM −0.502 −0.068 −221.299
detH 0.072 0.135 15.753
MRSC 0.547 0.796 0.337
(cs.s.1 , c
s.s
2 ) 0.929 0.929 0.012
in the offer curve is small enough and the appropriate initial conditions are in
place, it is also possible that agents’ savings jump from being positive to being
negative.
As we can see from Table 2, multiple steady states are possible when MH is
considered. This situation is nongeneric because the only way to have multiple
monetary steady states is for consumers to be indifferent between two (or more)
levels of savings when R = 1 holds. In other words, we make sure that the maxima
we obtain from the consumers’ optimization problem yield exactly the same utility
level. Recall from Proposition 2 that multiple maxima never occur under SH. If the
choice of how to model savings behavior in the presence of habits is not innocuous,
as we have shown, the predictions and policy prescriptions based on the two types
of habit persistence are going to be quite different.
4.1. Endowment Profiles or Outer Utility?
In a recent paper, Bunzel (2006) argues that, regardless of whether one adopts SH
or MH, the dynamical properties of the pure exchange economy are very similar.
She imposes an outer utility function that is CRRA and for tractability she consid-
ers only the case in which the second period endowments are zero. Here we show
that Bunzel’s irrelevance results are driven by the specific choice of the utility
function and not by the particular endowment profile considered. If one adopts
the HARA utility function, then the MH specification can indeed affect the qual-
itative properties of the dynamical system even when there is no second period
endowment. The intuition behind our result can be seen by computing the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) with respect to the second period effective
consumption, cˆ2, under the two alternative habit specifications using HARA and
CRRA:
RRAHARASH =
ασ(c2 − γ c1)
Mσ + α(c2 − γ c1)
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RRAHARAMH =
ασ
(
c2/c
γ
1
)
Mσ + α(c2/cγ1 )
RRACRRASH = RRACRRAMH = σ.
Thus, in this framework, when one adopts CRRA utility function the implicit
assumption is that relative risk-aversion with respect to the effective consumption is
constant and independent of wealth. On the contrary, with an HARA specification
the relative risk-aversion with respect to second period effective consumption is
time varying and contingent on the initial endowments. These facts clearly impact
saving’s behavior across specifications. Assuming an outer utility function of the
CRRA type imposes an extra restriction, which is questionable and should at least
be tested empirically in the context of overlapping generations models with habit
persistence.
Example 2. Keeping all the other utility parameters as in example 1, but setting
the endowments to be w1 = 3, and w2 = 0, and calibrating the strength of habits
such as that the IES is 1 in steady state we find two monetary steady states under
MH and a unique monetary steady state under SH. In particular, γ = 0.293 for
the SH specification and γ = 0.989 for the MH specification. Local dynamics
associated with these two sets of steady states are quite different.
As we can see from Table 3, optimal savings across the two specifications are
positive. Both under SH and MH agents are saving, which is not too surprising
given the specific endowment profile proposed by Bunzel (2006). As far as the local
dynamics of the economy are concerned, all steady states are unstable under both
habit specifications. The evolution of savings around the steady state under SH
displays diverging monotonic dynamics. This is also the case for the Steady State
II under MH but savings around Steady State I display nondamped oscillations,
instead.
TABLE 3. Multiplicity of equilibria under MH but not under SH
SH MH
Steady State Steady State I Steady State II
ss.s. 2.10 0.377 2.761
cs.s.1 0.90 2.623 0.239
cs.s2 2.10 0.377 2.761
 0.015 −0.090 0.020
(1 + 1

) 66.5 −10.044 50.64
PM −0.353 −0.046 −27.096
detH 0.024 0.076 0.858
MRSC 0.545 1.341 0.411
(cs.s.1 , c
s.s
2 ) 1 1 0.075
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The point that we wanted to convey with these numerical examples is to illustrate
how multiplicity of equilibria, savings patterns, and the stability properties of an
economy can differ, depending on whether the utility specification is SH or MH.
In other words, the numerical examples above help us substantiate and illustrate
better the theoretical findings of the previous sections.
5. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is to examine the differences between two alternative
formulations used in the habit persistence literature. In particular, we explore
the consequences of adopting multiplicative versus subtractive habits in terms of
multiplicity of steady states, dynamic indeterminacy, and local dynamics. We find
that in a pure exchange two-period lived overlapping generations model, adopting
MH as opposed to SH can result in very different outcomes. First, we show that
in general under MH, the optimization problem may not be concave and that
preferences are not homothetic. Second, we find that multiple monetary steady
states cannot be ruled out under MH. Third, we provide numerical examples that
illustrate how the local dynamic properties of the economy crucially depend on
the type of habits considered as well as their strength.
Finally, it is worth to point out that we did not fully explore the differences in the
global dynamics of the two alternative specifications. Because discontinuities in
the offer curve are possible under MH because of the nonconvexity of preferences,
dynamic equilibrium may not exist for some initial conditions. However, the offer
curve under SH is continuous. Our educated guess, therefore, is that SH and MH
could yield very different time series patterns. This suggests that the results on
the irrelevance of modeling habits by Bunzel (2006) may not hold under a more
general specification of preferences even at the global level. We leave this for
future research.
Our findings indicate that there are important differences on how savings behave
across the two most commonly adopted habit specifications. The choice of how to
model savings behavior in the presence of habits is not as innocuous as it might
seem. Hence, the predictions and policy prescriptions based on the two types of
habit persistence modeling choices could be quite different.
NOTES
1. Some examples of MH are Abel (1990) and Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) and, for SH,
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Constantinides (1990).
2. See Boldrin and Woodford (1990) for a survey.
3. Specifically, both the absolute level of consumption in the second period and the change in
consumption between the two periods are important. The higher the consumption when young, the
more consumption in the following period is required to derive a given level of utility.
4. In this case, one needs to impose also γ < c1/c2.
5. By second period “effective” consumption, we mean cˆ2 = c2 − γ c1 in the SH case, and
cˆ2 = c2/cγ1 in the MH case.
6. See Konishi and Perera-Tallo (1997).
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7. The first to study the gross substitutability condition in a two-period overlapping generation
model is Grandmont (1985).
8. See Ingersoll (1987) for a survey of this literature.
9. Carroll (2000, p. 68) points out other reasons to avoid CRRA in habit formation models. He
states that: “CRRA utility in combination with the subtractive formulation . . . has several theoretical
problems, the gravest of which is that for microeconomically plausible parameterizations of con-
sumption variation the equation [of consumption] accumulation can easily lead to a zero or negative
argument to the [utility] function . . . generating infinite negative utility.”
10. See Guvenen (2006) for more details.
11. Note that the qualitative properties of the offer curve and that of the steady states can be
replicated under many other parameterizations.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. (i) The principal minor of the Hessian associated with the SH specification is
given by u′′(c1) + γ 2βv′′(c2 − γ c1). Note that this expression is always negative. The
determinant is given by βu′′(c1)v′′(c2 − γ c1), which is always positive. Therefore, the
Hessian is negative definite and concavity is ensured.
(ii) Repeating the process for the case of MH, we find that the first principal minor is
negative if and only if
u′′(c1) + γβ(γ + 1) c2
c
γ+2
1
v′
(
c2
c
γ
1
)
+ γ 2β c
2
2
c
2(γ+1)
1
v′′
(
c2
c
γ
1
)
< 0,
and the determinant is positive if and only if
v′′
(
c2
c
γ
1
)
u′′(c1) + γ (1 − γ )β c2
c
γ+2
1
v′
(
c2
c
γ
1
)
v′′
(
c2
c
γ
1
)
> γ 2β
1
c21
[
v′
(
c2
c
γ
1
)]2
.
Therefore, the Hessian is negative semidefinite only under certain parameter restrictions.
To check that these conditions could be violated in some cases, we need to provide at least
one explicit example where the objective is not concave. Consider the HARA instantaneous
utility together with MH:
V (c1, c2) = 11 − σ
[
σ
(
A + αc1
σ
)1−σ]
+ β 1
1 − σ
[
σ
(
A + α
σ
c2
c
γ
1
)1−σ]
.
Let w1 = 3, w2 = 1, γ = 0.75, σ = 0.39, A = −1, α = 0.79, and β = 0.55. Then for
st ∈ [0.974, 2.289], concavity is violated.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. It it sufficient to show that the utility function in the subtractive case is homoge-
neous of degree n, whereas the one in the multiplicative case is not. Let λ > 0 be a scalar.
If we multiply the first and second period consumption by λ in the subtractive case we
obtain: V (λc1, λc2) = u(λc1) + βv(λc2 − γ λc1) = u(λc1) + βv(λ(c2 − γ c1)). Assuming
that the felicity functions u(.) and v(.) are homogeneous of degree n, then the overall utility
function is clearly homothetic, that is, λnu(c1) + λnβv(c2 − γ c1) = λnV (c1, c2).
For the multiplicative case, instead, we show that the utility function is not homogeneous
of degree n regardless of the degree of homogeneity of u(.) and v(.). Specifically,
V (λc1, λc2) = u(λc1) + βv
(
λc2
(λc1)γ
)
= u(λc1) + βv
(
λ(1−γ )
c2
c1γ
)
.
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And thus it follows that if one assumes that the felicity functions u(.) and v(.) are homo-
geneous of degree n:
λnu(c1) + λnβv
(
c2
c
γ
1
)
= λnV (c1, c2).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. The implicit function that defines the optimal level of savings, sˆ, under SH is
given by
β(R + γ )v′((R + γ )s + w2 − γw1) = u′(w1 − s).
Because both the left- and the right-hand side of the first order condition (FOC) are
continuous and differentiable, we can study the sign of the derivatives. More precisely, we
find the following expressions:
∂u′(w1 − s)
∂s
= −u′′(w1 − s) > 0
∂β(R + γ )v′((R + γ )s + w2 − γw1)
∂s
= β(R + γ )2v′′((R + γ )s + w2 − γw1) < 0
Note that the second expression (derivative of the left-hand side of the FOC) is strictly
decreasing in s and the first expression (derivative of the right-hand side of the FOC) is
strictly increasing in s. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique level of
optimal savings, sˆ. A nontrivial equilibrium always exist: to prove this, we can advocate
Corollary 1 on page 535 of Konishi and Perera-Tallo (1997). They provide separate condi-
tions on preferences and the production function that ensure the existence of a nontrivial
steady state. Because in our framework the condition on the production function is trivially
satisfied, we just need to worry about the requirement on preferences. This requirement is
that the utility function is homothetic; and this is exactly the case for SH as proved here.
However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn under MH because of a lack of homo-
theticity. Furthermore, the implicit function that defines s∗, the optimal level of savings in
the MH case, is given by
βv′
[
Rs + w2
(w1 − s)γ
] [
R(w1 − s) + γ (Rs + w2)
(w1 − s)γ
]
= u′(w1 − s).
Whereas the right-hand side is strictly increasing in s, the sign of the slope for the
left-hand side depends on the underlying parameters of the economy. After simplifications,
we have the following expression:
∂βv′
[
Rs +w2
(w1 − s)γ
] [
R(w1− s )+ γ (Rs+w2)
(w1 − s)γ
]
∂s
= β
[
R(w1 − s)+ (Rs +w2)γ
(w1 − s)γ+1
]
×
{
v′′
[
Rs + w2
(w1 − s)γ
] [
R(w1 − s) + γ (Rs + w2)(w1 − s)γ−1
(w1 − s)2γ
]
+ v′
[
Rs + w2
(w1 − s)γ
](
3γ + 1
w1 − s
)}
.
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Thus, whether the left-hand side is increasing or decreasing in s depends on the following
condition:
−
v′
(
Rs +w2
(w1 − s)γ
)
v′′
(
Rs +w2
(w1 − s)γ
) ≷ R(w1 − s) + γ (Rs + w2)(w1 − s)γ−1
(3γ + 1)(w1−s)2γ−1 .
Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibilities for multiple or a continuum of equilibrium
values of s∗. Note that we cannot rule out the possibility of no equilibria either.
